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Abstract
The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the two Russian wars in Chechnya were the longest, most protracted
conflicts of the USSR and Russia after WWII. Both were conducted under conditions of unprecedented violence
in peripheral territories. Despite their distance in time and space, both wars are closely linked to each other on
the level of cultural representations in contemporary Russia. This paper analyses how the conflicts were
represented in a key Soviet and Russian newspaper as the wars unfolded. It analyses the textual and visual
coverage of the wars in the Krasnaia zvezda (1980-1986; 2000-2003), in order to disclose changing
interpretations of violence and the Other. The paper argues, firstly, that Krasnaia zvezda told the story of two
different types of violence prevailing in each conflict. The Afghan case was presented as one that put the social
and cultural transformation of the population at the center of its attention – violence was hence not only physical
and excessive but also cultural, as it aimed at the social fabric of society. The Chechen case focused on the
recapture of territory and the restoration of sovereignty. Therefore, physical violence appeared more bluntly in
the coverage of the conflict. Secondly, the paper shows that these two different types of violence implied two
different visions of the Other. In Afghanistan, the Other was represented as becoming more and more similar to
the socialist Self. This dynamic is visually underscored by numerous images of Afghans who have embarked on
the path to Soviet modernity. In Chechnya, in contrast, the Other was presented as traditional, backward, and
immutable. The Other was usually reduced to complete cultural difference and depicted a dehumanized fashion.
This orientalization of the Other was a precondition for the use of excessive physical violence. 







































The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the two Russian wars in Chechnya were the most
protracted conflicts of the USSR and of Russia after WWII. During the occupation of
Afghanistan, between 1979 and 1989, Moscow sent 620,000 troops into the country to
support a revolutionary regime and its efforts to transform society. According to official
figures, 13,833 soldiers never made it back home. However, other sources suggest that about
75,000 died in combat, and that roughly 1.3 million civilians were killed (Feifer 2009, 254-
255).1 Figures for the wars in Chechnya, roughly between 1994 and 2008, are even more
unreliable. Official accounts of this conflict, which was widely fought by federal troops to
keep separatist Chechnya within Russia, put the number of soldiers killed at 3,613 between
1999 and 2007 (Oushakine 2009, 152). Independent experts estimate that the total death toll
could be up to 160,000 people (RFE/RL 2014).2
 Both wars were peripheral conflicts, and were waged in societies considered to be
deeply different in terms of culture, religion, and lifestyle (Seniavskaia 2006, 231). They are
closely linked on the cultural level, with their contemporary representations in various media
drawing on each other. The conflict in Chechnya is understood on the cultural level through
the lens of the experiences made in Afghanistan.3 This cross-reference also applies to the
veterans of the Chechen war, who use the comparison with the Soviet war in Afghanistan as a
basic narrative for structuring their own memories, seeing themselves as “younger brothers”
of the Afgantsy, the veterans of the Afghanistan war (Zvereva 2002; Oushakine 2009, 157-
171; Varennikov 2004). 
The aim of this paper is to proceed from this contemporary cultural interconnectedness
between the representations of these conflicts, and to highlight commonalities and differences
in their visual and textual coverage while the conflicts took place. To achieve this aim, I will
draw on photographs and reports published in the official newspaper of the Ministry of
Defense, Krasnaia zvezda [Red Star]. This “special interest” newspaper reflects official
positions and was published without interruption during the whole period under scrutiny.
Focusing on military affairs, it covered both conflicts regularly and prominently.
1 Feifer (2009) provides a concise introduction into the War in Afghanistan. For more detailed accounts see
Braithwaite (2013) and Kalinovsky (2011). They all draw on Liakhovskii (1995). For an account covering
the Soviet and Russian involvement in Afghanistan see Gareev (1996).
2 About the consequences of the Chechen wars cf. Le Huérou (2014).
3 Galina Zvereva underscored that the “direct comparison of the experience in Chechnya with that of the USSR
in Afghanistan has a crucial importance for the makers of mass [cultural] products. It is ‘doomed to succeed’
to the extent that it fully coincides with (...) collective imaginations and formulas of ‘narrative knowledge’”
Zvereva (2002, 102-109).
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While I will repeatedly allude to the historical and political contexts of the reports and
photographs under scrutiny, my paper will widely abstain from “historicizing the spectator,”
as demanded by John Tagg (1982, 113). Rather, my more modest aim is to analyze two
selected areas of representation and compare how their visualization changed over a timespan
of thirty years. Firstly, I will compare the ways Krasnaia zvezda depicted the encounter
between Self and Other. Secondly, I will deduce from the imagery basic Soviet and Russian
ideas about the types of violence that were exercised in Afghanistan and Chechnya,
respectively. 
While I am aware that this imagery will tell few things about the actual events on the
ground, it can say a lot about the story the Ministry of Defense wanted to tell its Soviet and
Russian audience about these wars at the edges of their countries, as well as about the official
views on violence and otherness. Put differently, this coverage is a proxy for the Soviet
Union’s and post-Soviet Russia’s self-projection and mise-en-scène, as well as for their
relation to their respective peripheries. Thus, I am not concerned with the actual history of
these conflicts, with the violence that took place, but rather interested in the changing sense
and meaning Krasnaia zvezda tried to confer to violence and otherness. To achieve this aim, I
will make particular use of ideas developed by French political anthropologist Pierre Clastres.
Violence and the State
Archeology of Violence, first published in 1980 by Clastres, refers to the role of war and
violence, mainly in primitive societies.4 However, it also provides valuable insights on the
discourse on violence within social sciences, and ultimately, how “modern man” conceives
violence whenever encountering or applying it in the “wilderness” of distant places.
Clastres distinguished three approaches to violence. Firstly, the naturalist approach,
according to which violence belongs to the human as species. Almost as a “zoological
property of the human species, violence is identified here as a (…) natural given rooted in the
biological being of man” (Clastres 2010, 243). Clastres quickly dismisses this view, pointing
out that the biologization of violence disregards its deeply social dimension.
The second conception is the economist approach. It departs from the conviction that
primitive societies are always societies of poverty, and that this lack inevitably leads to
4 Clastres “advances a functionally positive relation between ‘war’ (…) and the collective intentionality that
defines what constitutes primitive societies” (Viveiros de Castro 2010, 10).
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violent competition (Clastres 2010, 247).5 Lashing out against this economist and Marxist
arguments, Clastres argues that in primitive societies all needs were carefully gauged and met.
Surplus production was possible but useless (Clastres 2010, 250, 259).
Finally, the exchangist argument, following Lévi-Strauss, points at the continuity
between exchange and war. If exchange fails, violence will ensue (Clastres 2010, 253).
Clastres is clearly bothered by assigning to violence the status of a corollary, stripping it of
any independent value. He aims at acknowledging the autonomy of violence as well as its
political character. Clastres stresses that violence in primitive societies rests on their wish to
maintain independence and distinctiveness – hence, “war is a structure of primitive society,”
because the society refuses by all means division (Clastres 2010, 264). In this sense, for
Clastres, the State means the end of the primitive society because it is the end of society as an
undivided We, making primitive society a Society Against the State. Concurring with Hobbes,
Clastres argues that “war prevents the State, [and that] the State prevents war” (Clastres 2010,
277), however disagreeing with him that a warring, and thus stateless society is no society at
all.
We will see to which extent these conceptions of violence, war and the state can also
be traced in the Soviet and Russian representations of the conflicts in Afghanistan and
Chechnya. What they all share is a conception of violence as something visible and physical.6 
Encountering the Other
Being deeply suspicious of the modern state, Pierre Clastres also contributed to systematize
the contact between industrial and less developed societies. For him, in these encounters, the
latter always tended either toward to the cultural removal of the latter’s difference
(“ethnocide”) or to its physical elimination (“genocide”). Ethnocide and genocide both have
the same starting point: a notion of the Other as representing a negative difference. However,
ethnocide and genocide handle this Otherness differently: genocide proceeds to physically
remove difference, while ethnocide rests on the assumption that the Other can be reformed
and improved. While “genocide” is physical, “ethnocide” is the destruction of “ways of living
and thinking” (Clastres 1974, 102).7 It is crucial to see that both activities come with an excess
5 This position also echoes strongly the European 19th century discourses that equate pauperism with a social
danger and evoke the fear of the mob (Procacci 1991, 158).
6 Here, Clastres fails to grasp the structural dimension of violence to which Johan Galtung (1969) has referred
and whose insights remain valid today (Dilts 2012, 192).
7 This notion of improvement of the Other permeates much of Western thought since the times of colonialism,
as has been argued by Tania M. Li (2007). As for the Soviet Union, it “was founded on ideas and plans for
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of violence, albeit assuming different forms. The former is intentional, bodily, visible, (Popitz
1992, 48), the latter is no less intentional, however, it concerns body and mind, and can
remain invisible. Ethnocidal violence belongs to the essence of the state, Clastres argues
(1974, 107),8 because the state negates difference. Clastres also raises the question to which
extent ethnocide (and genocide) require the existence of a modern state bureaucracy in order
to take place.9
The Soviet attitude to its periphery tended to the “ethnocide.” As a matter of fact,
within the USSR, the aim was to forge a sovietskii narod (Edgar 2006, 582). This attempt at
forging a common identity was preceded by an intellectual and organizational effort to
scientifically define difference and establish otherness, starting in the 1920s (Hirsch 2005,
101-230). Only then, after determining and fixing national identity, all these identities were
foreseen to melt into one overarching Soviet people. Thus, the Other is considered to be
different but on an evolutionary path to become equal, something similar to what the Russian
imperial elite called “spiritual fusion” (sliianie) in the 1870s (Tolz 2001, 36). The idea of the
“new historical community - sovietskii narod” implies a grand strategy of inclusion (Mirsky
2001, 293), which, however, could also turn violent. We will see how this inclusive
understanding of the Other is reflected in the Afghan case but is totally absent in the Chechen
one. In the former instance, we can expect the reappearance of the patterns adopted within the
Soviet Union itself, especially in Central Asia; in the latter case, the Chechens are represented
as having failed to comply with the cultural and political model proposed. They remained
utterly different and hence excluded.
A key concept looming behind this discussion is Orientalism.10 Both concerning
Afghanistan and Chechnya, orientalist patterns of interpretation surface time and again. This
is even more so, because there is an intimate link between Orientalism and war: Waging war
on the Other requires its orientalization (Barkawi and Stanski 2012, 2-3). However, a key
feature of Orientalism which will repeatedly come up is that it can also entail “a tutelary
the betterment of humanity, rather than on concepts of identity and nation,” and it inherited the belief to be
endowed “with a special destiny to clear the Asian wilderness and civilize the tribes of the East” (Westad
2007, 37-40).
8  “Toute organisation étatique est ethnocidaire, l'ethnocide est le mode normal d'existence de l'état”
(Clastres 1974, 107).
9 Interestingly then, the modern state, for Clastres, prevents war, as seen above. On the other hand, it does not
prevent ethnocide - quite the contrary. While tying ethnocide closely to the state, Clastres anticipates the
critique against Kaldor (1999); he also echoes Foucault’s argument on state racism (Foucault 1978) but is at
odds with Arendt’s insistence on the “inherent genocidal potential of the modern state” (Bartov 2000,130).
10 Orientalism is “the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient,” a style for “having authority over the
Orient” and “a style of thought” (Said, 2003, 2-3). For a discussion of Russian Orientalism cf. Khalid (2000).
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relationship with the Other, when the Other is not equal, but can come of age and become the
Self,” with a “dimension of irreducible difference and antagonism” being absent (Barkawi and
Stanski 2012, 24); this holds for Afghanistan but not for Chechnya, as will be shown below. 
Photography and the visibility of violence
My aim in this brief section is to introduce a discursive understanding of photography, and to
stress that pictures depend on texts to be interpreted. I also would like to highlight the role
photography played as a means to produce and reproduce very clear-cut representations of the
Self and the Other, as well as its connection to violence. 
In contrast to Roland Barthes (1977, 33-34), Allan Sekula claims that the “photograph,
as it stands alone, presents merely the possibility of meaning. (…) it is impossible even to
conceive of an actual photograph in a ‘free state’, unattached to a system of validation and
support, that is, to a discourse” (Sekula 1982, 91). Hence, I will make extensive use of the
texts which surround each picture directly and indirectly, seeing text and photograph as a
discursive unity. Due to my empirical interest, the concepts of otherness and violence will
serve as primary lens for interpreting the pictures.
For Tagg (1982), photography is not only vested with the power to represent but also
calls for the installation of a certain order. It shapes ideas of a social and political system or
regime. Photographs demand the establishment of “a clear space, a healthy space, a space of
unobstructed lines of sight, open to vision and supervision; a desirable space in which bodies
will be changed into disease-free, orderly, docile and disciplined subjects; a space, in
Foucault's sense, of a new strategy of power-knowledge” (Tagg 1982, 64). 
We will see that Soviet and Russian coverage of the conflicts in Afghanistan and
Chechnya follows exactly this pattern. It carries an authoritative message, vested with the
power of the Soviet and Russian state and of its dominant political discourse, including
distinctive perceptions of Otherness and of violence. This paper will argue that the depictions
i n Krasnaia zvezda are full of allusions to Afghanistan and Chechnya as violent and
disorderly places as well as to the Other and its body; to a body that can be transformed to be
disease-free and docile (Afghanistan), implying structural, “ethnocidal” violence; or to a body
that is neither orderly nor disciplined and must be forced into submission adopting a physical,
“genocidal” violence (Chechnya).
Finally, visibility and violence are intimately linked to each other. While critically
engaging with Galtung’s notion of structural violence (Galtung 1969), questioning it as too
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broad and vague, Yves Winter also criticizes that “positivist definitions of violence restrict
violence to the intentional, direct, immediate, and visible infliction of physical harm” (Winter
2012, 195-196). Such definitions of violence (Popitz 1992, Trotha 1997, Sofsky 1996, 2003,
Tilly 2001, Collins 2011) or excessive violence (Baberowski 2012), as useful as they are, risk
refusing to recognize invisible, but no less physical, forms of injury as violent (Winter 2012,
196). 
Physical violence, or the consequences of it, are key topics of war photography that can
trigger a wide set of reactions (Sontag 2003). They reinforce positivist conceptions of
violence, supporting the demand to identify a clear “perpetrator who can be held responsible
and to whom blame can be apportioned” (Winter 2012, 198). Structural violence, in the
understanding I would like to advance, can also be physical, harming bodies and inflicting
injuries, however, also encompassing the forced change of culture. Also, structural violence
can have multiple, perpetrators, who are hard to identify, a point criticized by Trotha (1997,
19).
Hence, the seemingly harmonious and peaceful pictures that we will see in Krasnaia
zvezda’s coverage of Afghanistan do contain power, hierarchy, threat and a violence that,
however, escapes the “fetishization of the visible” (Winter). It requires a hermeneutic
operation in order to be read as a violence that remains absent from the field of (visual)
intelligibility.11  The violent act, that Trotha (1997, 20) wants to study to understand violence,
is present and is physical, but it is in need to be unraveled.
Thus, pictures from war that are explicitly peaceful, pictures of occupation that are
harmonious, pictures of colonization that are free of struggle and resistance, are both non-
violent and violent at the same time. They do not show physical harm, however, they point to
an ongoing violent transformation of culture and society that certainly implies also the bodily,
deadly injury, which Trotha (1997, 14) considers to be necessary for the definition of
violence. This structural violence is invisible and implied. It is subtler than physical violence
and can still be very bodily in its effects, changing, for example, dress codes or gender
relations. Furthermore, “if silenced, especially if silenced, the violence spreads to the next
generations” (Julia Kristeva quoted in Winter 2012, 195) – the silent, invisible violence is
devised to shape the generations to come. 
11 “The social scientific debate over what counts as violence is not as innocuous as one may imagine but
reflects and contributes to these norms of visibility and recognizability” (Winter 2012, 198).
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Afghanistan: Transforming the population
The sample pictures under scrutiny are taken from Krasnaia zvezda issues published between
1980 and 1986 and reflect the gap between official justifications and the combat reality of
Soviet soldiers.12 The prevailing depictions represent the conflict as a widely non-violent
activity. The extreme physical violence that accompanied the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan, the atrocities committed by all sides in the Gewaltraum Afghanistan (Behrends,
this volume), are denied and remain completely invisible. However, what comes to the fore is
the violence of a quasi-colonial power that seeks to turn the fabric of a whole population
upside-down, affecting bodies and minds of the Afghan population. The Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan assisted a mission civilisatrice that was initiated by the Afghan government and
that encompassed various fields of intervention, from medicine, gender-relations, technology
transfer and the advancement of modernity as conceived in Late Socialism.13 The imagery
does not point at territory but rather at the Afghan population as field of intervention, at
securing not at conquering. Afghanistan is explicitly not depicted as Gewaltraum but emerges
as field of various forms of intervention, however, without the one typical for war:
“defeating” the Other.14 Still, the imagery points to a deeper dimension of violence as
described above by Clastres’ concept of “ethnocide.” It is about preserving and reproducing
the Soviet Self and about transforming the Other. 
Meeting the Other
Encounters between Soviet soldiers and the Afghan population constitute one main topic in
the visual representation of the USSR’s occupation of Afghanistan, especially after 1981.
These encounters take place in a myriad of settings. Roughly speaking, they either involve
meetings between Soviet soldiers with young, modern and urban Afghans, who have already
12 The period under scrutiny covers the heyday of occupation. According to Mikhail Gorbachev, considerations
to leave took shape in 1985: “To us it was already clear in 1985 that we had to leave Afghanistan. But we
could not do it at once,” Arkhiv Gorbachev-Fonda, f. 2, op. 1, k. 8049 (Tezisy k nachalu vystupleniia M.S.
Gorbacheva na Sovete Oborony, 17 October 1989). At the same time, Gorbachev declared that “the region is
strategically important and we cannot remain indifferent (…) It is important to us that the peoples know, that
one can rely on the USSR,” Arkhiv Gorbachev-Fonda, f. 3 op. 1, k. 4771 (Iz besedy M.S. Gorbacheva s
Bettino Craxi, 29 May 1985). 
13 For the earnest of the Soviet efforts to transform Afghanistan see Robinson and Dixon (2013). For a
discussion of modernizing wars see Malinowski (2008).
14  Ruslan Aushev, chairman of a veterans’ committee, explicitly confirms these thoughts in an interview with
Ekho Moskvy: “[In Afghanistan,] we did not have the task, as many say, to defeat somebody (...) The main
task for us in Afghanistan was to secure. Secure the transport of goods, secure communications, help the
Afghan army” (Larina 2014). Also Gareev (1996, 371) prefers to speak of a failure of Soviet politics rather
than of a failure of the military.
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adopted a modern lifestyle and correspond to the vision of socialist development, for example
students, or with elderly, rural Afghans, farmers who are in need of Soviet support and advice.
Meeting on the way (Krasnaia zvezda, 20 November 1983) depicts an elderly Afghan farmer
talking to a young Soviet soldier in the countryside. The white-bearded, turban-wearing
farmer holds a shovel in his left hand. The young soldier is visibly younger and taller than his
interlocutor. The soldier wears a wide Panama-like hat with brims in front and back that
shield him from the sun. Both are standing face-to-face, smiling. A third, younger Afghan is
placed at the picture’s center in the background, between soldier and farmer. The caption
informs us that this is the soldier Irali Karimov having one of his “unforgettable meetings on
the road”. Despite the fact that the farmer is obviously depicted as backward and different, the
stress put in the text is on what Soviet and Afghan people share. While “a smile needs no
translation” (ibid.), Karimov comes from Central Asia and his language is well understood by
the locals.15 Additionally, the report’s author is surprised by how many Afghans, who are
generally “gifted to learn foreign languages,” actually know Russian, especially the children.
The peasant’s sons are serving in the army, and “want to become literate” (ibid.). Common
language and special access are key messages of this photograph. This message is elaborated
in detail in the text. The latter confers a sense of rapprochement between Self and Other,
which are already so close in many senses. The Soviets can already communicate to the
Afghans. Now it is the Afghans’ turn to do the same and learn Russian. Especially the
countries’ children adapt, study Russian, serve in the army, become literate, i.e. they become
a bit more Soviet, i.e. more modern and a bit less backward. The story and its depiction show
how even in culturally and socially distant places, like the Afghan countryside, the Soviet
Union claims to have a special access, “a particular ability to understand the Asians” (Tolz
2011, 49-50). Hence, the Other, is not perceived as so different, after all, a view contradicted
in later interviews with Soviet Soldiers from Central Asia (Buser and Broadhead 1992, 166).
Still, in this imagery, it is the Soviet soldiers who possess a “flexible positional superiority”:
in terms of age, neither being children nor old men, and in terms of military strength, a rifle
vs. a shovel, hence confirming a tenet of Orientalism.16 The violence of transformation
15 Vadim Zagladin confirms this intimate link between Central Asia and Afghanistan in the minds of the Soviet
leadership: “Basically we tried to push our Afghan friends to an accelerated advancement of socialism,
according to the example of our Central Asia (…).”Arkhiv Gorbachev-Fonda, f. 3, op. 1, k. 7192
(Dokladnaia zapiska V.V. Zagladina, 20 February 1989).
16 “Orientalism depends for its strategy on this flexible positional superiority, which puts the Westerner in a
whole series of possible relationships with the Orient without ever losing him the relative upper hand” (Said
2003, 7).
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becomes visible in the stress put on the coming generations that will adapt to modern
standards imposed by the Soviets. Interestingly, these generations are only in the background
of the photograph – instead, it is traditional Afghanistan, which is visible in the picture. The
Soviets claim to supervise a non-violent cultural revolution. Thus, the violent transformation
that Afghanistan is undergoing remains up to the reader’s imagination.
 
Soviet physicians and Afghan civilians
A strikingly recurring sub-genre is the medical encounter. Pictures of this asymmetrical
setting are so abounding that it would seem that the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan
not with soldiers but with medics. From a military point of view, healthcare often was a
means of gathering intelligence in Afghanistan (Braithwaite 2013, 126). More importantly,
however, there is a long tradition of complicity between medicine and colonialism. Medical
visits and public health inspections, for example, “were key tools for the ordering of colonial
space” (Keller 2006, 28; see also Michaels 2003; Agamben 2005, 147-148; Weizman 2012,
53-55). The visual representation of medical visits points straight to the “disease-free, orderly,
docile and disciplined subjects,” to which Tagg (1982, 64) referred. With medicine and
healthcare being domains deemed especially suitable for women, the medical encounter also
was a recurring topic in the depiction of Soviet women’s involvement in the conflict.17 It is
also a genre, which repeatedly puts Afghan children in front of the lens. The medical
encounter is, finally, a meeting between modernity and backwardness, between recipients and
provider of superior knowledge.18 With medicine being a bodily affair, this encounter is also
physical, and there was only a thin line separating healing the patient’s body from harming it.
In Krasnaia zvezda, this encounter takes place especially in and after 1983. In On Afghan Soil,
for example, a Soviet nurse is surrounded by seven children of different age, four girls and
three boys (Krasnaja Zvezda, 24 September 1983). They are standing outdoors, backing a
stonewall. The dark-haired nurse, with the distinguishing high hat typical for Soviet medics
and a stethoscope around her neck, smilingly leans forward and downward to the children. All
but one girl are unveiled, suggesting an urban setting or children of urban/middle class
17 For Elena Losoto hospitals represented “the uttermost limit (...) of female activity [in Afghanistan], only men
go further” (Losoto 1990, 23). For an overview on the role of women in the Soviet Army and especially in
Afghanistan, cf. Seniavskaia (1999, 160-170). 
18 Bulgakov’s Country Doctor's Notebooks provide another excellent example for how medicine is cast as an
encounter between urban modernity, embodied by the doctor coming from the city (and desperately longing
for its modern amenities), and rural backwardness, ignorance and superstition, embodied by an internal other,
the Russian peasant.
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upbringing, an impression supported by the neat clothing of the kids but which, however, is
contradicted by the caption. Again, we have a very relaxed atmosphere. The exact relationship
between nurse and children, who seem all merry and healthy, as all locals in other pictures as
well, remains unclear. Is this an occasional visit to a village? Are the children in some
pediatric section of a hospital? Such questions as to the precise whereabouts remain
undisclosed by the picture itself and are only revealed by the accompanying text. At any rate,
they also do not appear to play any role in the message the picture tries to convey: “Children
are always sympathetic to kindness, even if they do not understand the words uttered in a
foreign language”: the nurse Ljubov’ Epifanova, the short caption suggests, masters the
language of kindness that enables her to gain access to the Other. Similarly in the picture
mentioned before, the photograph suggests that there is a meta-language that the Soviet speak
and that allows to bridge differences. As the Soviet forces altogether, the nurse “came to the
kishlak upon request of the inhabitants” (ibid.). What she came for, the reader can only guess:
utter word of kindness to the healthy, adopt medical knowledge to the sick. However, she also
represents modern gender relations and their violent impositions over “backward” traditions.
The depiction of the medical encounter, irrespective of whether it actually took place or not,19
reassures the Soviet reader that through this form of meeting in Afghanistan, there is “a
submission to authority” (Keller 2006, 32) and to advanced knowledge, the recognition of
superiority and a relationship of mutual trust. However, Frantz Fanon, a fervent advocate of
violent resistance to colonialism, has argued that in the colonial context the “clinical
relationship” of trust between physician and medic is blurred and that to “reject medical
authority, was to reject colonialism itself” (Keller 2006, 29). Thus, the medical encounter is in
multiple ways a violent one. This violence encompasses also gender relations, which are
altered in and through the depiction of the medical encounter. They are also another core topic
in the coverage of Afghan women, to be discussed in the following section.
Unveiling Afghan women
“Many who have worked on British colonialism in South Asia have noted the use of the
woman question in colonial policies (...) was used to justify rule” (Abu-Lughod 2002, 784).
This holds also for Soviet Central Asia and Afghanistan, and the most visible sign of the
alleged oppression has always been the veil. Indeed, what is completely absent in the whole
19 In her memoir, Elena Losoto shows that even in Kabul it was too dangerous to move around freely; hence, 
medical field-trips to the countryside seem rather unlikely. Still, she argues that Soviet medical facilities also 
treated locals and were hence spared from enemy fire. (Losoto 1990, 5-8, 21-23).
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representation of the Afghan campaign in Krasnaia zvezda is the depiction of veiled women.
Instead, the representation of unveiled Afghan women in different sectors of society is
frequent. There are repeated allusions to how unveiling is a necessary and positive thing that
is associated with other achievements the Revolution has brought to Afghanistan. 
Krasnaia zvezda’s feature on The heart's warmth describes and comments a meeting between
Afghan and Russian women at a military unit (Krasnaia zvezda 5 January 1984). The double
portrait photograph related to the report depicts two women, one with fair, one with dark hair,
standing closely side-by-side smiling brightly into the camera. Both wear colorful, plunging
blouses. They are identified in the caption as Ljudmila Paukova from Briansk, and Nafisa
Sofi, an Afghan teacher at a girls’ school. The narrative of the article emphasizes the interest
of Afghan women in modern Soviet life in the USSR, especially in the living conditions of
Soviet women. Their Soviet counterparts are eager to inform them about their daily lives back
home, about the history and customs of their cities of origin. “At a first glance it’s a meeting
like many. But this fact is very precious. First of all, it is the change in the position of the
women in (…) Afghanistan. The Democratic Women’s Organisation of Afghanistan lives,
works, and broadens its ranks (…) while the majority [of the women] still is illiterate and
while the influences of Islam and of tenacious medieval customs are still felt, there is no
return to the past”. Interestingly then, first, Islam was explicitly dissociated from modernity,
deemed to be incompatible with it. However, it is not yet a threat as it will be later in the
coverage of Chechnya. Secondly, the majority of women, the illiterate backward part, was
mentioned but remained completely invisible. While they never found their way into the
imagery of Krasnaia zvezda, we visually meet the most advanced and modern examples of
Afghan womanhood, women open to the Soviet, modern lifestyles. The picture couples the
intensity of a personal encounter with the topic of modernisation. Hence, the perspective of
the Meeting on the way mentioned above is inverted: We see the progress, we do not see the
backwardness. We actually see how lifestyles have been changed. Indeed, in this picture
difference disappears. The Soviet and the Afghan women are similar in style and dressing. It
is precisely the eradication of difference, the loss of identity that for Clastres is violent and
causes violent reactions. This blurring of differences also becomes visible in the next picture. 
Also the reporting on the “first Afghan female surgeon” comes with a portrait depiction of
two women that attempts to visible differences between Self and Other. The only visible
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difference between the two Friends (Krasnaia zvezda, 6 March 1984) is that one is dark-
haired and the other blonde. Both are directing their glance beyond of the picture's frame.
Their clothing suggests that they work in the medical sector. The heroine of this story of
progress is Sukhaila Seddik, standing on the right, the first female surgeon of Afghanistan.
Her “weapons in the fight against the counter-revolution are a scalpel and her knowledge”.
Born in Kabul, she obtained her medical degree in Moscow, a city of which she is said to
have fond memories. The woman at her side, on the left, is introduced as her assistant and
friend, the Russian nurse Liudmila Babikova. Hence, Soviet presence is reduced to that of an
assistant, providing help if summoned to do so by her superior, handing over the required
instruments, giving advice in moments of doubt, performing secondary tasks during day-to-
day routines. The relation seems technical, operational, aimed at specific common tasks,
which require common expertise. The women resemble each other in their professional
outfits, reducing their identities to their professional role. A key theme to which this picture
and the title of the report refer is that of friendship, and more specifically of druzhba narodov
[friendship of the peoples]. Hence, the friendship between Sukhaila and Liudmila is not only
personal or institutional but represents the friendship between Afghan and Soviet people.20
Liudmila can be interpreted as Sukhaila’s “friend, sister, and example” (Behrends 2008). The
story told here, however, partly runs against the main reading of the friendship of peoples,
because it destabilizes the hierarchical separation between nations still implied in the practice
of druzhba narodov (Sahadeo 2007, 568). A central topic that emerges from this picture is the
issue of women’s rights. They occupy a key place in the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan
(Meier 2001, 94-96). “Saving Muslim women,” in Lila Abu-Lughod’s terms, is both a litmus-
test of progress as well as a strategy to justify occupation and forced adaptation.21 
Afghan outlaws: a phenomenon of the past
One of the most stunning characteristics of the reporting on Afghanistan in Krasnaia zvezda is
the nearly complete absence of a depiction of enemy fighters. Given the scale of conflict and
the excess of violence by all parties, the lack of reporting in this regard clearly underscores
the propagandistic character of the newspaper. As discussed above, the Afghan population
might be backward, however, all in all, it is friendly and well-disposed to Soviet advice, even
eager to acquire Soviet knowledge and follow the path to modernity. Still, there are very few
occasional depictions of resistance and violence, which were highly regulated: Soviet
20 On the problematic nature of this “friendship oft he peoples“ see Behrends (2005).
21 On Soviet attitudes towards Islam see for instance Edgar (2006).
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authorities made it a taboo to depict physical violence and still in 1985, depiction of “sporadic
cases (…) of wounded or killed soviet soldiers” was officially limited to “not more than one
per month” in the Soviet press.22 In a very rare, early depiction of Soviet prisoners, we have
Outlaws (bandity) (Krasnaia zvezda, 16 September 1980). Six outlaws are standing in line.
All of them wear long cloths and traditional headgears, and all appear to be rather elderly. A
single, young soldier at the right margin of the picture guards them. While his prisoners are
depicted as traditional or backward at worst, they all retain a certain expression of dignity.
The soldier guarding them appears, in stark contrast, to be extremely young, insecure,
clumsily holding an oversized assault-rifle. The story told is not one of complete victory and
total defeat, as we will see in Chechnya. Rather it is, again, a juxtaposition of backwardness
and progress. Instead of orientalizing the Other as in Chechnya, as will be shown below, it is
Afghanistan’s past which is orientalized in the imagery of Krasnaia zvezda. The picture could
also be read in the sense that while the backwardness is yet numerically superior (in 1980),
progress as represented by the shy soldier already prevails. While the young soldier is the
future, the elderly outlaws are a phenomenon of past.
Chechnya: reconquering a lost territory
To analyze the nature of violence and Self-Other relations in Chechnya, I turned to Krasnaia
zvezda issues from January 2000 to December 2003, at the peak of the Second Chechen War.
The violence as depicted on Krasnaia zvezda's pages during this period seems to be of a
completely different character than the depiction of the occupation of Afghanistan: It is
visible and physical. Most intriguingly, civilians are largely absent from the coverage. There
was a deliberate lack of interest for the civilians in Chechens, because they are not considered
to be transformable. The “structural violence” of colonization disappears and what remains is
the physical one. The overwhelming number of photographs is dedicated to Russian soldiers
in action, performing deeply soldierly tasks. However, I will focus on some the exceptions in
Krasnaia zvezda's reporting, in order to allow for a direct comparison with the visual material
on Afghanistan.23 
22 RGANI, f. 89, dok. 103, per. 11, l. 3 (O publikatsiakh v stredstvakh massovoi informatsii materialov
otnositel’no deiistvii ogranichennogo kontingenta sovetskikh voisk v Afganistane, 24 June1985).
23  Also, the formal use of images changed drastically. While during the 1980s there was a close connection
between pictures, captions and report, with the latter often providing an extended interpretation of the picture,
now, in the 2000s, text and picture loosely relate to each other. The same pictures were used several times to
provide illustration for any random report about Chechnya. Hence, certain topics per se represent Chechnya.
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Civilians and children
Civilians rarely appear in the newspaper’s reports on Chechnya. While it might well be that in
the early phases of the war there was simply no possibility to take pictures of civilian life as it
virtually came to a halt, this explanation does not hold for later issues.
In Frontline Outpost of Law, a Russian soldier is checking the papers of a Chechen woman
(Krasnaia zvezda, 16 March 2001). She holds a young child in her arms, who cries while
looking at the tall soldier in his neat uniform. The woman’s facial expression is desperate. In
the background, a multitude of women and young men can be seen. From the left a huge hand
is about to reach to the papers in the soldier’s hand, picking out or pointing to a specific
document. In the right corner of the picture another hand holds an ID, possibly of a local
waiting in line to present her papers. The picture confers a sense of chaos and confusion, with
the soldier being the sole anchor of stability in this turmoil. Most likely this disorder is result
of violence and military action that had taken place earlier, before the picture has been shot,
or the picture shows a notorious “filtration point.” The accompanying text gives no direct
explanation about the details of this photograph. However, the report is remarkable because it
does not stress past violence, but rather ongoing violence. It conceives Chechnya as unruly
Gewaltraum: “Chechnya is not only an ache [bol’], but also a continuous concern [zabota],”
the key task is to restore a “peaceful life, to feed the local population, to make them safe from
on-going rowdyism.”24 Hence, it requires the return of the Russian state. Not surprisingly,
then, the focus of the report shifts away from victims (the local population) and perpetrators
(the “rowdies”) to the enforcers of a new stability, to agents of the state, namely to the state
prosecutors. Coming from different parts of the Russian Federation to Chechnya, their task is
to guarantee legality, law and order [zakonnost’ i pravoporiadok] in a violent environment.
The report thus echoes a key theme of official Russian discourse in that period,25 and the
scene of the photograph will seem familiar to many readers.26 Difficulties arise, the report
explains, because the attorneys have to deal with people “who only yesterday were fighting
and who are ready to reach for the arms at any moment, for any reason. For many of them,
law has an abstract meaning” (Krasnaia zvezda, 16 March 2001). Thus, what is interesting
about this description of the Other is that, on the one hand, there are peaceful locals who
24 For the roots of the Russian usage of the term khuliganstvo, see Neuberger (1993).
25 The return of order and legality was a key theme of Vladimir Putin’s presidential campaign and remained a
pillar of his legitimacy. Famously, he promised a “dictatorship of law” (Putin 2008, 49).
26 Police checking the papers of people from the Caucasus or Central Asia is a common sight in Russian cities. 
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deserve care and protection, those shown in the photograph. On the other hand, they have
been previously under arms and have no proper understanding of legality; being backward
and inclined towards violence, they make it hard for the modern Russian state to install
legality. This position echoes what Clastres had denounced as the naturalist approach to
violence. Compared to Afghanistan, where the overall majority of the population was friendly
and advancing to modernity, despite some small pockets of counter-revolution and crime,
now the population is described as potentially dangerous, with the line between militants and
civilians being blurred.27 Chechens have an “abstract meaning of the rule of law,” which is a
feature of modernity, and are therefore prone to violence. Still, this backward community
might still possess human features: concerning Afghanistan, Krasnaia zvezda, put much
emphasis on children, regarding Chechnya the theme returns, although with a surprising twist.
 
Complementing an interview to the commander of the North Caucasus Military District,
Vladimir Boldyrev, in the wake of the 2003 referendum, Gray and wise Caucasus features a
picture which reminds those relating to the Afghanistan war (Krasnaia zvezda, 21 March
2003): In front of an armored vehicle, a Russian soldier is kneeling down to hand over small
gifts to a young Chechen girl, easily identifiable by her “typical” headscarf. They are joined
by a boy of even younger age. This topic, at first glance, strongly recalls pictures from
Afghanistan. Yet, in contrast to Afghan representations, it has at least two sub-texts: first,
from top of an armored vehicle, another soldier watches over this encounter. Also, in contrast
to the Soviet soldiers meeting Afghans, this soldier is in full body armor and shoulders a rifle.
Thus, the threat of armed conflict and physical violence is clearly visible in this picture, while
it is widely erased in depictions from Afghanistan. Second, there is no hint at changing local
culture. Difference is preserved and clearly visible: there seems to be no intention to further
any change in this regard. The accompanying report is not directly related to the picture. It is
only an embedded caption (in the printed version of Krasnaia zvezda but omitted in the online
version) that gives a title to the picture, “With an open heart,” reminding the “Heart’s
warmth” in Afghanistan. Boldyrev, of course, does not mention the soldiers’ open hearts.
Rather, when asked about first impressions from his travels to the garrisons, he boasts about
the “obvious power of the North Caucasus Military District” [ochevidnaia moshch’ SKVO]
and that it is in southern regions of the Federation that the strongest part of the country’s army
27 Gareev (1996, 375) briefly alludes to the situation in Chechnya and stresses that its “peaceful inhabitants“
can be equipped with machine-guns or grenade launchers. 
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is concentrated. There is, nevertheless, one hint at the picture’s topic, as he mentions that “the
most important thing in the District is that the people, soldiers, officers, the civilian personnel
fulfill even the most difficult tasks, displaying combat experience, great professionalism and
moral readiness”. With this hint, Boldyrev gets as close as he can to the “open heart”
mentioned in the picture’s caption. Still, he seems to live in a separate, distant world in which
readiness to exert military force needed to subdue the enemy is the key feature. Thus, there is
a disconnect between the photograph that suggest the kindness of past times and the report
that stresses military might, thus pointing a disconnect between visible and invisible violence.
In contrast to the report above, Khattab-Iugend deals with threatening Chechen civilians
(Krasnaia zvezda, 11 October 2000). The photograph related to the article depicts three young
boys with short hair, standing on a road, each holding an oversized Kalashnikov rifle. We see
them waist-up. Two of them smile brightly, looking at one point to the right of the spectator.
Only the third boy looks straight but more seriously into the lens of the camera. The picture
strongly contrasts with the picture mentioned above and again with the celebration of youth
and of children in Afghanistan. While in Afghanistan, children were deemed to be the bright
future of a prospering and socialist country, children now turn into a threat. The rifles in the
hands of the children emphasize the violence that could erupt at any moment. The report
stresses the ideological indoctrination of children and how they are manipulated to hate and
fight others. The theme of manipulation will resurface with regard to women. Illiteracy, which
was discussed regularly concerning Afghanistan, briefly resurfaces also in this report (“They
cannot read, but hold a rifle”). However, while in Afghanistan it was stressed how Soviet
assistance helped to eradicate it, in Chechnya, illiteracy seems to be an unchangeable fact of
Chechen life. Radicalized, uneducated children appear as potential danger to the Russian
troops and thus simply as a military problem to be solved. If there ever was a Soviet civilizing
mission in Chechnya, it must have failed. Using the German term Jugend (“youth”) alludes to
Hitler-Youth and hence at the deeply running opposition which separates the Russian soldiers
from their enemies. Reconciliation or negotiation with such a radicalism, which can only be
compared to “fascism,” is impossible and calls for violent means as the only option to counter
it. “Fascism” was also deployed to denote the enemies in the ongoing conflict between Russia
and Ukraine, again making reconciliation hardly a viable option. As children and the civilian
population in general are represented as mostly hostile in Chechnya, so the perceived role of
military medics has changed as compared to Afghanistan.
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Russian physicians and Russian soldiers
Army physicians in Chechnya are repeatedly featured in Krasnaia zvezda. While in
Afghanistan, they appeared to be integral part of the Soviet mission civilisatrice, of the
machine of societal transformation, now, in Chechnya, they are released from this task
altogether. They are depicted as completely devoted to the care of Russian soldiers. In
Chechnya, we do not have a colonial medicine at work, but rather medical care devoted to the
Russian military only. Accordingly, we now see them inside hospitals, and not making field
trips to Chechen villages. 
Here they return to the ranks describes the work of a Russian military hospital, the fate of
various soldiers who have been wounded in Chechnya, and how they are patched together by
the medics (Krasnaia zvezda, 28 February 2001). The report stresses the high degree of
professionalism of the medical staff, which knows their patients by heart. The three young
surgeons in the picture associated with the report are sitting side-by-side at their workplace
and are introduced by name. The two young men and the women at the center confer a sense
of professional calm amid a putative busy schedule. They look confidently and relaxed into
the camera. However, the mask in surgeon’s hand on the right suggests that they have been
performing medical tasks just seconds before the picture has been taken or are about to do so
in the next moment. The room the physicians are sitting in appears clean and neat. Its
austerity, however, contrasts with the modernity of the hospital described in the text. The
violence and the result of the violence that provided these physicians with work remains
invisible in this picture. Interestingly, it is the effects of the resistance’s violence that are
obscured. Finally, the female surgeon depicted here is one of the very few examples of
Russian women working in the context of the Chechen conflict. However, also Chechen
women are rarely depicted. 
The absence of women
Modern Afghan women have been a key topic in Krasnaia zvezda’s reporting on Afghanistan.
The narrative is completely different in the Chechen case. Actually, it is the other way round:
what we see are only the “backward” women in a double guise: either as dangerous (“black
widows”) or merry and traditional. 
18/28
Discussing the normalisation of the situation in Chechnya after the fully-fledged war, women
reappear here in Electing a leader, they set a course in a traditional guise (Krasnaia zvezda,
October 11, 2003): three young Chechen girls wearing traditional clothes and scarves
apparently perform a traditional dance against the backdrop of green plants. While the girl at
the center places her arms up, the other’s arms point downwards. Smiling young women
suggest a restoration of normality. However, strikingly, modern or secular, femininity has no
place in the depictions of Chechnya in the Krasnaia zvezda, anticipating the Islamization that
took place after the war (Szczepanikova, this volume). The newspaper visually returns to a
one-sided picture of women as in the Afghan case but totally focuses on tradition. 
This approach is in line with reports that cover terrorism (for example Krasnaia
zvezda, 5 March 2003 and Krasnaia zvezda, 28 August 2003), and which directly link it to
Chechen women. In these reports, the newspaper presents a negative discussion of Chechen
femininity, which is closely tied to “Islam.” Has terror a female face? (Krasnaia zvezda, 5
March 2003) discusses why “potential mothers” turn into terrorists. The article highlights how
women from all over the Caucasus are psychologically manipulated by “terrorists” until they
see no other option to escape the moral and physical humiliation they suffer. What strikes the
reader is, firstly, that in this representation, the women concerned lack any agency. Passively
they are drawn to terrorism. The agency re-emerges only in the terrorist undertaking. That the
women concerned might act consciously is neglected. Secondly, female terrorism is
depoliticized. It is just result of a manipulation. The underlying political struggle is erased.
While the picture strongly hints at a violent, de-humanizing and de-feminizing Islam, which is
closely linked to extremism and terrorism,28 the report stresses how such violence runs against
the Faith’s teachings, by which the newspaper claims to have the correct understanding of
Islam. Given the widespread violence against women during the Chechen conflict, it is
appalling to see how victims are turned into perpetrators in Krasnaia zvezda’s reporting. By
adopting this perspective, the vicious circle of violence is continued. Chechnya is cast as a
violent space and this violence justifies violent state intervention, paradoxically, in order to
reduce violence, however just spurring violent resistance.
The defeated Other
28 The second Russo-Chechen conflict was framed into the context of the international “War on terror,” and
terrorism and extremism were used interchangeably (Bacon, Renz, and Cooper 2006, 115-123). Terrorism
was chiefly seen as a military issue alone. A rare departure from this stance came in 2009, when Dmitry
Medvedev declared the problems in the North Caucasus to be socioeconomic in nature (Medvedev 2009).
19/28
As in the reports from the 1980s, depictions of the enemy in arms are scarce. While many
photographs confer a sense of danger and alarm, there are few pictures of actual “terrorists” or
“insurgents.” 
ABC with a wolf’s grin (Krasnaia zvezda, 6 June 2001) reports about a successful operation
against “criminals.” In contrast to the prisoners depicted in Afghanistan, however, what we
find here is a completely different visual narrative. While the Afghan prisoners had been
depicted standing in front of the camera, not even being handcuffed, and preserving a certain
dignity, in this depiction two Chechen “outlaws” seem utterly defeated. They squat deeply in
front of their captors on an open field, in front of a military jeep with open front and rear
doors. Their legs are torn into an awkward angle. The men stripped to the waist, blindfolded,
barefooted and handcuffed. The impression of total defeat is reinforced by the overwhelming
physical appearance of the two fully-armed Russian soldiers guarding them: one of them
appears extremely tall and heavy, standing directly in front of and above one of his captives.
The latter seems to be at his total mercy. In contrast to the heavy physical appearance of the
soldiers, the prisoners seem small and skinny, bent forward into a submissive posture. Hence,
this is the depiction of a physical victory of the strong against the weak, of a successfully
applied violence. It is also the visual reversal of the narrative of the embarrassing first
Chechen war, in which experienced Chechen militiamen defeated weak Russian conscripts. It
also reverses the story of humiliating retreat from Afghanistan.
Conclusions
Thirty years elapsed between the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the Second Russo-
Chechen war, and historical circumstances changed dramatically. The pictures analyzed in
this paper reflect very well the stark differences in the self-perception of the USSR and of
post-Soviet Russia. Most importantly, they underscore that post-Soviet Russia carries no
historical or developmental project for its periphery (Prozorov 201, 272). While the Soviet
Union professed a belief in social transformation and displayed a modernizing, self-
confidence in its “specific,” socialist, “civilizing mission,” post-Soviet Russia’s dominating
political discourse after 1999 put much more emphasis on sovereignty, law and order, on
preserving its territory and its spheres of influence. However, the photographs in Krasnaia
zvezda reveal more. 
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The paper analyzed photographs of the two conflicts in Krasnaia zvezda under two
aspects. Firstly, it identified forms of violence in the respective depictions of the conflicts.
Secondly, it discussed the Self-Other construction involved in these visual representations. All
in all, the visual and non-visual narratives on Chechnya and Afghanistan share one
commonality: Chechnya and Afghanistan are depicted as places lacking order. They either
need the installment of a new social and cultural order (Afghanistan), or the re-installment of
a previously lost political order (Chechnya). Otherwise, Krasnaia zvezda presents two
different narratives of the conflicts.
Regarding the forms of violence involved in the conflicts, the war in Chechnya has
been depicted as space of violence, which requires the application of military force to defeat
and subdue the other in order to restore state sovereignty. While Krasnaia zvezda conveyed
the message that the USSR tried to secure Afghanistan, the newspaper is unambiguous that
Russia tried to reconquer Chechnya. Therefore, violence became much more visible in the
depictions of Chechnya, and less so regarding Afghanistan. This suggests that the power
exercised over Chechnya, as depicted in Krasnaia zvezda, rested much more on the right of
the sword and much less on patience, wisdom, and diligence,29 as allegedly the power in
Afghanistan. Since the Other is orientalized in Chechnya, it is possible to wage war against it.
Thus, the representation of the conflict in Chechnya contains more hints at “genocidal”
violence than at “ethnocide,” in Pierre Clastres’ terms, since a transformation of the way of
life of the Chechen population was just of no interest to the Russian regime. This lack of
interest in the population is directly linked to the indiscriminate violence that was actually
applied in Chechnya. What further buttresses this claim is the consistent depiction of the
Chechen population as stuck in backwardness. As long as it poses no threat it can stay as it is.
The Chechen resistance is extensively discussed. The Chechen violence is cast as a resistance
against the Russian state’s authority and portrayed as a feature of Chechen culture, echoing
the naturalist approach mentioned by Clastres (2010).
Concerning Afghanistan, in contrast, Krasnaia zvezda tells the story of a Soviet
occupation that had only a minor military component, opening a big gap between ubiquitous
physical violence on the ground and its erasure from official representation. First and
foremost, the Soviet intervention appears to have been about changing the way of life of a
population, about taking it out of so-called medieval customs and elevating it to modern,
29 “Sovereign power’s effect on life is exercised only when the sovereign can kill. (...) It is essentially the right
of the sword” (Foucault 2003, 137, 240). See also Foucault (1978, 136).
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Soviet standards. For Clastres, this would have been an attempt at “ethnocide.” This endeavor
was primarily a cultural one and Krasnaia zvezda focuses fully on this violence against
culture, with physical violence remaining invisible but implied. Since it is Afghan past that is
orientalized, war is waged more on traditional lifestyles than on the Other itself. Afghans
themselves are depicted as being eager to take over the form of modernity proposed by the
Soviet Union. Accordingly, what we see are episodes of peaceful interaction between
Afghans and Soviets in a myriad of different settings. Afghan society becomes the primary
target of intervention and the ordinary Soviet private a major agent of change. The soldiers are
depicted in activities that are definitely not that of warriors as in Chechnya but more of social
workers, physicians or agricultural experts, whose task it is to secure the Afghan population,
possibly improving their living conditions and their environment, and ultimately: the overall
betterment of the population itself, i.e. the advancement of socialism. Behind these pictures of
harmony and progress, looms a specter of violence exercised not only on the Afghan culture
but also on Afghan’s bodies. An indirect hint at this corporeal dimension is given by the
depiction of the medical encounter. The imagery related to the medical encounter conveys a
sense of the Soviet authorities’ alleged tutelary relationship between the Self and the Other as
well as their superiority in terms of power, skills and knowledge. Resistance is almost absent
from Krasnaia zvezda’s reporting. The hint at banditism mentioned above, points in the
direction of an economist approach to violence, as described by Clastres. Hence, eradicating
poverty and backwardness and advancing socialist modernity, would suffice to quell the
remnants of Afghan resistance.
Regarding the depiction of the Other clear differences have emerged. However, there
is one striking commonality: it is one-sided in both cases. This applies especially with regard
to the female identities presented in Krasnaia zvezda, which are either only modern in the
Afghan case, or only traditional in the Chechen case. In Afghanistan, on the one hand, the
newspaper put great emphasis on showing how modern femininity is established through
Soviet intervention. Especially in its visual representation, Krasnaia zvezda leaves little room
for reflecting the complexity of gender relations in Afghanistan. Either women are completely
modern, or, as the reports describe verbally but seldom visually, Afghan women remain stuck
in backwardness.30 
30 Krasnaia zvezda omits for example that in the Afghan countryside, male/female segregation was much looser
than in the cities Hirschkind and Mahmood (2002, 339).
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In the case of Chechnya, on the other hand, women predominantly appear as potential
threats and passive victims, which can be easily manipulated. They are always associated with
a traditional lifestyle. There seems to be nothing left of Soviet Chechnya. Rather, Chechnya
appears as immune to change, reflecting a typical orientalist conception of an immutable East
(Said 2003, 86). Hence, in Chechnya we have a conflict in which two completely different
cultures oppose each other. In Afghanistan, religion appears as symbol of backward traditions
In the coverage of Chechnya, Islam appears as a threat and as a symbol of a violent culture.
Violence generally seems to be an essential, almost genetic trait of Chechen society. Thus,
violence seems to be the only means apt to act in the framework of such a Gewaltraum. As a
consequence, there are very few photographs of friendly encounters with the Other, who
either remains a largely threatening presence, or a defeated one. In Afghanistan, however,
informal, casual, spontaneous meetings were a key theme, as if we had encounters at a deeply
popular plane, far-away from official, organized or imposed gatherings. 
I would like to highlight two implications of these meetings as they are depicted in
Krasnaia zvezda. Firstly, the encounters between these emissaries involve an asymmetrical
meeting of knowledge, between a superior and an inferior one. The Soviet soldiers appear as
the bearer of modern civilization. They are depicted as passing it on to the Afghans who are
shown as being eager eager to adapt.31 Secondly, this transfer of knowledge presupposes that
Soviets have a privileged access to the population of Afghanistan, especially due to the
alleged cultural proximity of Central Asian soldiers. Actually these soldiers experienced a
double pressure: on the one hand, they had trouble to adapting to an Afghan society that was
so distant from their Soviet lives (Buser and Broadhead 1992), on the other hand, they were
distrusted by their fellow Russian soldiers (Feifer 2009, 105). While Central Asians might
have been discriminated in Russian cities (Sahadeo 2007, 567), on the pages of Krasnaia
zvezda they were shining examples of the New Soviet Person, for how socialist modernity and
attachment to cultural traditions can go along, and for the Soviet Union’s empathy for the
peoples of the East. 
In Chechnya, depicting such encounters was impossible, because of the assumption of
the Other’s hostility; even children were depicted as dangerous. The Other appears
dehumanized, blindfolded and handcuffed, veiled and faceless. The Self, in contrast, is strong
and dominating. As opposed to the imagery of Afghanistan, emphasis is put on the
31 In Orientalism “the Other wants what the Self has to give her” (Chowdhury 2012, 20). While this
“superiority” might be a typical theme of “druzhba narodov,” it remains doubtful whether it could be equally
applied to European “friends.”
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construction of masculinity: Chechnya was, as Galina Zvereva (2006) succinctly put it, a male
business, a rabota dlia mushchin. Afghanistan, among other thanks to the emphasis on the
medical encounter, seems to be a female endeavor as well, a rabota dlia zhenshchin. 
Hence, in Pierre Clastres’ terms, the overall Soviet approach in Afghanistan that
Krasnaia zvezda describes is that of “ethnocidal” violence against the backdrop of poverty-
driven resistance: the USSR attempted to erase an traditional culture and replace it by a new,
modern and socialist one. This was possible since the Other was assumed to be able and even
eager to change and “improve.” In Chechnya, in contrast, Krasnaia zvezda’s visual
representation suggests physical, “genocidal” violence against the backdrop of a inherently
violent Chechen culture: since the Other is not reformable, neither willing nor able, since it is
utterly different and dangerous, the only option seems to violently subdue it.
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